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Recent FERC Efforts to Remedy Inadequate
Transmission Capacity and the Implications for the
Development of Wind Power
Brian M. Bowman*
INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the Federal Power Act, the United States
Department of Energy (“DOE”) is required to conduct a study
every three years that examines electric transmission congestion
and constraints within the nation’s power grid.1 The most recent
DOE National Electric Transmission Congestion Study
(“NETCS”) was published in December 20092 and, by order of the
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, included an
“analysis of significant potential sources of renewable energy that
are constrained by lack of adequate transmission capacity.”3
Among its many findings, the 2009 NETCS highlighted that the
gap between the potential for wind development in areas with high
wind development potential and actual new wind development in
those areas exists “principally because there is neither adequate
transmission capacity to deliver wind generation, nor an
expeditious way to build new transmission for that purpose.”4

Copyright 2013, by BRIAN M. BOWMAN.
* Brian M. Bowman is a Fellow with Wake Forest University’s Center for
Energy, Environment and Sustainability.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2005).
2. The next NETCS is currently being prepared and will include an
examination of “[r]ecent, current and planned transmission and interconnection
queues.” WORKSHOP NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENT, 76 FED. REG.
70122–70123 (Dep’t of Energy Jan. 10, 2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod
/files/2012CongestionStudyNov10.pdf. At present, a great deal of uncertainty
surrounds the release of the upcoming NETCS given, in part, to a U.S. Court of
Appeals decision in 2011 that vacated DOE’s designations of certain “national
corridors” based on the NETCS released in 2006. 27-SUM Nat. Resources &
Env’t 51; see also California Wilderness Coalition v. DOE, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 2011).
3. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
2012 National Electric Commission Congestion Study, ENERGY.GOV,
http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation
/transmission-planning/2012-national (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
4. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
CONGESTION STUDY 18 (2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files
/Congestion_Study_2009.pdf.
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As of the end of September 2012, the United States had a total
of 51,630 megawatts (MWs) of wind power capacity installations5
with an additional 8,430 MWs under construction.6 As the 2009
NETCS recognized, lack of transmission capacity remains a major
impediment to both the installation of additional MWs and the
elimination of curtailment of operating wind farms.7 As of the end
of 2009, there were approximately 300,000 MWs of proposed wind
projects waiting in interconnection queues.8 Of this figure, roughly
100,000 MWs were located in the upper Midwest and Central Plains
regions. Both were identified by the DOE in the 2009 NETCS as
areas “where it appears that the development of significant
additional [wind] generation—using existing technology with
known cost and performance characteristics—is limited primarily by
the availability of transmission capacity.”9 In the Northeast, it is
estimated that consumers in New York could save hundreds of
millions of dollars annually, while also realizing the increased
“economic benefits of renewable resources” through upgrades to the
transmission system that would result in reduced congestion.10
Clearly put, inadequate transmission capacity hinders the
development of wind power as a source of electricity generation in
5. For purposes of comparison, total U.S. coal generation capacity is
342,296 MW and total U.S. natural gas generation capacity is 467,214 MW (this
numbers are as of November 2011 and are past due to be updated in November
2012). U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRIC POWER
ANNUAL 2010, available at http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph240/nam2
/docs/epa.pdf.
6. AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, U.S. WIND INDUSTRY THIRD
QUARTER 2012 MARKET REPORT 3 (Oct. 2012), http://www.awea.org/learnabout
/publications/reports/upload/3Q2012-Market-Report_Public-Version.pdf.
7. MICHAEL DWORKIN ET AL., THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLES 546 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1st ed. 2011) (noting that the
“lack of available transmission” has had a “clearly material” impact on
renewable energy development).
8. American Wind Energy Association, Annual Statistics on U.S. Wind
Energy, Year ending 2009 16, http://www.awea.org/_cs_upload/learnabout
/publications/5094_1.pdf (hereinafter “American Wind Association, Year ending
2009); see also American Wind Energy Association, Annual Statistics on U.S.
Wind Energy, Year ending 2008 5, http://www.awea.org/learnabout/publications
/upload/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.pdf (“The proposed wind projects in
these queues have applied for interconnection to the grid, but most of these wind
plants cannot be built because there is insufficient transmission capacity to carry
the electricity they would produce. While not all of these wind projects will
ultimately be built, it is still clear that wind power development is outpacing the
expansion and modernization of our electric grid.”).
9. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 4, at 22–23, with
AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, YEAR ENDING 2009, supra note 8.
10. FERC Grants ROE Incentive, 3888 PUR Util. REG. NEWS 3 (Sept. 6,
2008).
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the United States. The two primary remedies to this deficiency are
(1) to build out the nation’s transmission system and (2) to
improve the integration of wind power into the transmission
system. The avenues for achieving these remedies are to first
incentivize investment and second to improve planning for better
integration of wind power into the transmission system. This
Article examines the mechanisms in place at the federal level to
facilitate these remedies. Section I provides a brief overview of the
different levels of government, the regulatory agencies, and other
organizations involved in the regulation and operation of the
transmission system. Section II provides an overview and analysis
of FERC Order No. 679, which is the primary mechanism in place
to incentivize investment in transmission system assets. Finally,
Section III examines FERC Order No. 1000, which lays the
framework to improve transmission system planning, and discusses
the implications of that measure on facilitating an increase in
transmission capacity.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION REGULATION
The regulation of the electricity transmission system occurs on
several levels. In addition, a number of governmental agencies and
non-governmental organizations play a role in regulating the
transmission sector.
A. The Federal Level
The federal government first attempted to regulate the
transmission system through the 1920 Federal Power Act.11 The
Federal Power Act created the Federal Power Commission—the
predecessor to the present day Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”)—and granted that institution the “authority
over interstate wholesale electricity trade and its associated
transmission interconnections and rate-making practices.”12 The
last piece of significant legislation to amend the Federal Power Act
and have an impact on the regulatory landscape overseeing the
transmission system was the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“Energy
Act 2005”).13
FERC draws its authority to regulate electricity markets from
the Federal Power Act. Section 205 of the Federal Power Act
requires that rate filings be submitted to FERC by public utilities
11. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 535.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 535–36.
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engaged in the wholesale electricity market, while Section 206 of
the Federal Power Act governs rate changes “initiated” by FERC
or via a third party complaint.14 In both of these instances, FERC is
mandated to protect consumers and ensure that the rate utilities
charge is “just and reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory or
preferential.”15
The United States Department of Energy was created in 1977 by
the Department of Energy Organization Act.16 The DOE has no
direct authority to regulate the transmission of electricity or the
electricity market. However, as indicated above, the DOE is
required by the Energy Act 2005 to conduct a NETCS every three
years.17 The NETCS is the mechanism through which the DOE
identifies national interest electric transmission corridors (“NIC”).18
Once an area is labeled a NIC, FERC has the ability to exercise
expanded regulatory powers in regard to the “construction or
modification of electric transmission facilities” within those areas.19
B. The Regional and State Levels
Since 1996, FERC has encouraged the concept of Independent
System Operators (“ISO”) as one method of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to transmission.20 In any transmission
system, there must be a system operator coordinating the flow of
electricity.21 An ISO is a system operator that performs this
function and is “independent of the existing electric utilities and
other market participants.”22 In the United States, ISOs were first
formed as the electrical industry’s response to FERC Order No.
888,23 a rule that called for “nondiscriminatory access to
14. Id. at 536.
15. Id.
16. The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9591, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7101).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2005).
18. These corridors are areas that are “experiencing electric energy
transmission capacity constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers.”
16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2). See also 27-SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 51.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b); 27-SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 51.
20. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/ Independent System
Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, www.ferc.gov/industries
/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Nov. 15, 2012).
21. WILLIAM W. HOGAN, INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR: PRICING AND
FLEXIBILITY IN A COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET 1 (1998).
22. Id.
23. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (1996).
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transmission service on a regional basis.”24 In response to this rule,
electricity generators, transmission providers, and utilities united to
“form voluntary organizations designed to reduce the opportunities
for transmission owners to discriminate against their transmission
service customers.”25 ISOs can be statewide or cover a group of
neighboring states or regions.26 Some ISOs also qualify as
Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”).
Although RTOs and ISOs are functionally equivalent, an RTO
satisfies the requirements of FERC Order No. 2000, which
includes several mandates relating to operator independence and
ensuring grid reliability.27 ISOs and RTOs are thus “FERCapproved regional organizations [that] operate as FERCjurisdictional entities.”28 As such, ISOs and RTOs are “required to
file a tariff with FERC that neither favors nor disfavors” any
system user and that openly provides transmission system access
“pursuant to a single, unbundled, grid-wide tariff that applie[s] to
all eligible users in a non-discriminatory manner.”29 Interstate
transmission “facilities overseen by RTOs or ISOs must satisfy the
region’s tariff” that must first be approved by FERC.30 At present,
there are ten ISOs/RTOs operating in the United States that
provide electricity to more than two-thirds of U.S. consumers.31
A utility, generator, or transmission provider that is not part of
an ISO or RTO must still provide open access transmission service
to interested third parties. States control transmission siting, and
transmission siting statutes and regulations vary from state to
state.32 Additionally, states have jurisdiction over lower voltage
distribution facilities and retail sales to ultimate consumers. As a
practical matter, if a utility is vertically-integrated—meaning the
utility owns generation, transmission, and distribution—the state
where the utility is located has significant regulatory authority over
that utility.
24. Matthew R. McGuire, (Mis)understanding “Undue Discrimination”:
FERC’s Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries of the Federal Power Act,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 555–56 (2012).
25. Id.
26. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), supra note 20.
27. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,285 (1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
28. McGuire, supra note 24, at 556.
29. Id.
30. Gabe Maser, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost-Causation Boogie-Woogie
Fails to Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L. J.
1829, 1832 (2012).
31. The ISO/ RTO Council, ISO/ RTO COUNCIL, http://www.isorto.org/site
/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2603295/k.BEAD/Home.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
32. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 538.
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II. INCENTIVIZING INVESTMENT IN TRANSMISSION ASSETS—FERC
ORDER NO. 679
Historically, investments in the “upgrade and expansion” of the
electricity transmission system have lacked any real incentives.33
Utilities were vertically-integrated and generally required to make
prudent investments to provide adequate service. Thus,
investments in transmission had to “compete” for capital internally
with generation and distribution investments. Difficulties in siting
long haul transmission lines, with returns on investment no higher
than normal, generally led to a lack of interest in major
transmission projects. Transmission lines were typically built to
move generation to local load. As a result, investment in
transmission has been deficient over time, and the existing
infrastructure places “considerable constraints on the amount of
wind generation that can be absorbed by the grid.”34 The Energy
Act of 2005 attempted to address this shortcoming by ordering
FERC to promulgate rules that promote capital investment in the
“enlargement, improvement, maintenance and operation” of the
transmission system.35 Toward this end, FERC issued Order No.
679, which became effective in September 2006.36
Of particular interest to FERC when promulgating Order No.
679 was “encourag[ing] investors to take the risks associated with
constructing large new transmission projects that can integrate new
generation[,] . . . reduce congestion and increase reliability.”37 As
such, Order No. 679 allows FERC to facilitate expanded capacity
and improved reliability in the transmission system by approving
public utility plans for transmission investment which include
incentive based rate treatment.38 Rate based incentives, known
collectively as “Risk Reducing Incentives,” include for example:
(1) higher return on equity (“ROE”) for transmission projects with
a higher than “normal” risk level, known as “Incentive ROE”; (2)
assurance of recovery of abandoned plant costs in the case where a
project is abandoned for reasons that are beyond the control of the
33. Emily E. Steinhilber & Jonathan R. Voegele, Taxation and Electricity
Transmission: Bringing Wind Energy Onto the Grid, in GREEN TAXATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 161 (Larry Kreiser et. al. eds., 2012).
34. Id.
35. See The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1241, 119
Stat. 594, 961.
36. Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform, Order No.
679, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057, (2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter
“Order No. 679”].
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 17–18.
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public utility; (3) an acceleration in the timing of recovery of new
transmission investments; and (4) streamlined rate adjustments in
connection with transmission investment.39 An applicant for such
rate based incentives must demonstrate in its proposed plans that
the “facilities for which it seeks incentives either ensure reliability
or reduce the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission
congestion,”40 “there is a nexus between the incentive sought and
the investment being made,” and the “resulting rates are just and
reasonable.”41
Through May 2011, FERC received more than seventy-five
applications for the transmission incentives provided for under
Order No. 679, totaling around $50 billion worth of transmission
investments.42 It is anticipated that by the close of the 2008 to 2016
period, about $36.2 billion will have been deployed.43 This
represents a sizeable allocation of capital.
A. Clarifying FERC’s Evaluation of Order No. 679 Rate Based
Incentive Applications
On November 15, 2012, FERC issued a Policy Statement that
provides guidance on how applications for Order No. 679 rate
based incentives will be henceforth evaluated.44 The clarification
included in this Policy Statement emphasized the evaluation
process for Order No. 679 rate based incentive applications. FERC
will require that both the nexus between the incentive sought and
the investment being made be highly correlated with the
requirements of Order No. 679 and that “applicants . . . take all
reasonable steps to mitigate the risks of a project, including
requesting those incentives designed to reduce the risk of a project,
before seeking an [I]ncentive ROE based on a project’s risks and
39. See generally id. at 49–107 (discussing the various rate based incentives
adopted by Order No. 679).
40. Thus satisfying Section 219 of EPA 2005. The Energy Policy Act of
2005, supra note 35, at § 219.
41. Order No. 679, supra note 36, at 45.
42. Notice of Inquiry, Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing
Reform, 18 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2011).
43. Energy Central, FERC Order 679 Responsible for $23bn of
Transmission Infrastructure Investment in 2012–2016, BUSINESS WIRE (Jul. 17,
2012), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120717005461/
en/FERC-Order-679-Responsible-23bn-Transmission-Infrastructure.
44. FERC Policy Statement Provides Guidance on Electric Transmission
Rate Incentives, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, (Nov. 15, 2012),
available at https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2012/2012-4/11-15-12E-3.asp.
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challenges.”45 With this Policy Statement, FERC places a greater
burden on applicants “to demonstrate how the total package of
incentives requested is tailored to address demonstrable risks and
challenges.”46 Specifically, if Risk Reducing Incentives could “. . .
reduce the risks of the project, that fact will be taken into account
in any request for an [Incentive] ROE.”47 Even prior to this Policy
Statement’s issuance, FERC signaled its intention to move toward
a more conservative approach in evaluating Order No. 679
Incentive ROE applications in an October 2011 decision to trim the
Incentive ROE by fifty basis points included in a proposal for a
major interregional transmission project.48
Toward this goal, FERC’s Policy Statement details four criteria
that applicants seeking an Incentive ROE for a proposed
transmission project’s “risks and challenges” should address in their
application. First, applicants should “demonstrate that the proposed
project faces risks and challenges that are not either already
accounted for in the base ROE or addressed through” the Risk
Reducing Incentives.49 The Policy Statement suggests that the first
requirement is satisfied by projects that (1) “relieve chronic or
severe grid congestion that has had demonstrated cost impacts to
consumers;” (2) “unlock location constrained generation resources”
which “previously had limited or no access to the wholesale
electricity markets;” or (3) “apply new technologies to facilitate
more efficient and reliable usage and operation of existing or new
facilities.”50
The second criteria applicants should provide when requesting
a “risks and challenges” based Incentive ROE is a demonstration
that the applicant is taking “appropriate steps and using appropriate
mechanisms to minimize its risks during project development.”51
This requirement can be achieved through several actions,
including requesting Risk Reducing Incentives, mitigating costs
through best practices in project management, and pursuing joint
ownership arrangements to “diversif[y] . . . financial risk across
multiple owners and minimiz[e] siting risks.”52
45. Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform, Policy
Statement, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,129 (2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 2 & 35)
[hereinafter “Policy Statement”].
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Reforming Order 679: Did FERC Jump the Gun?, 4042 PUR UTILITY
REGULATORY NEWS 1 (Oct. 21, 2011).
49. Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 14.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id. at 18.
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The third showing that Incentive ROE applicants should make
is “that alternatives to the project have been, or will be, considered
in either a relevant transmission planning process or another
appropriate forum.”53 The Policy Statement indicates that this
requirement “could be satisfied through participation in open
processes that are already in existence.” Examples of these open
processes include consideration in an “Order No. 890 or Order No.
1000 compliant54 transmission planning process” that allows for
comparison with alternatives or “by a local regulatory body, such
as a state utility commission that evaluated alternatives . . . and
determined that the proposed transmission project is preferable to
the alternatives evaluated.”55
Finally, the fourth requirement an applicant must meet when
applying for an Incentive ROE is “to commit to . . . a cost
estimate.”56 Satisfying this final requirement would, for example,
require limiting the requested Incentive ROE to the cost estimate
of the project at the time of RTO approval or utilizing another
approach to control transmission development costs and improve
transparency.57
B. The Policy Statement and the Integration of Wind Power
Under section 219 of the Federal Power Act, FERC must
encourage transmission development “while maintaining just and
reasonable rates” for consumers.58 Clear from the focus of the
Policy Statement is FERC’s belief that Incentive ROEs put “more
upward pressure on transmission rates” than Risk Reducing
Incentives and hence FERC encourages applicants to first examine
the Risk Reducing Incentives.59 However, as it is the Order No.
679 rate based incentive that directly improves the financial
attractiveness of a project, FERC’s granting of the Incentive ROE
potentially makes an investment in such a proposed transmission
project particularly appealing. As discussed, the FERC Policy
Statement narrows the types of projects to which it will grant an
Incentive ROE, provided applicants can satisfy the requirements.
Because wind power and most other renewable generation
resources are “location constrained,” proposed transmission
53. Id.
54. See infra Part III.
55. Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 19.
56. Id. at 20. The four requirements are collectively referred to as the
“Policy Statement Four Requirements.”
57. Id. at 20.
58. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 219 (2005).
59. Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 13–14.
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projects that would “unlock” wind and other renewable resources
and allow generated electricity to enter the wholesale markets
would likely satisfy FERC’s first requirement—i.e., that the
project be unaccounted for by base ROEs and Risk Reducing
Incentives.60 Significantly, this requirement is the only one which
prefers a certain group of generation technologies, specifically
those that are “location constrained,” such as wind and solar. The
other three requirements would apply equally to all proposed
transmission projects regardless of the type of generation the
proposed project serves. Since the Incentive ROE will likely not be
granted unless all four requirements are satisfied, a proposed
transmission project that provides generation technology for a
preferred project will be more financially attractive, and more
likely be implemented.61 This could further encourage the
development and integration of renewable generation technologies.
This point takes on additional importance with the realization
that the first requirement is the only requirement outside the
applicant’s control. An applicant controls the following: the steps
taken to mitigate the project risk, participation in a planning
process that compares the proposed project against alternatives,
and its commitment to a cost estimate. With control over these
three variables, an applicant can tailor its proposal toward
compliance with the second, third, and fourth requirements.
However, satisfaction of the first requirement, which is implicitly
project-type specific, is not an adjustable variable. Therefore, if all
other considerations are equal, projects that satisfy the first
requirement will be favored, since they are more likely to receive
an Incentive ROE. This again suggests that the Policy Statement
will have a positive impact on integrating and promoting wind
power and other renewables.
In addition to the rate based incentives discussed above,
FERC’s recent Order No. 1000—which reforms both transmission
planning and cost allocation policies, and eliminates the right of
first refusal that public utilities have historically enjoyed in
constructing and owning transmission—will likely be highly
effective in promoting transmission system expansion.62

60. See supra Part II(i).
61. And hence is eligible for the Incentive ROE if the other three of the
Policy Statement’s four requirements are satisfied.
62. Bryce W. Radford, First Refusals, Least Regrets, 148 No. 12 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 22 (2010).
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III. IMPROVING TRANSMISSION PLANNING—FERC ORDER NO. 1000
In July 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000 in an effort to build
upon FERC Order No. 890, which was a prior effort to promote
regional transmission planning.63 Although Order No. 890 did
result, to some extent, in the “improved . . . ability of wind
generation to access transmission,” it still had some shortcomings.64
Just like Order No. 890, Order No. 1000 focuses on process
rather than outcome. But it includes both the stipulation that public
utility transmission providers participate in more comprehensive
planning, and cost allocation activities that better account for the
integration of wind power and other renewable sources of
generation. As noted in Order No. 1000, the major deficiencies of
Order No. 890 included inadequate transmission planning
requirements and a lack of transmission cost allocation procedures,
both of which hindered transmission infrastructure expansion.65
Order No. 1000 addresses both of these shortcomings.
A. Changes to Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation:
Improving the Conditions for Integration of Wind
One requirement found in Order No. 1000 is that public utility
transmission providers (“PUTP”) participate in the regional
transmission planning process where such PUTP is located, as long
as the regional transmission planning process satisfies Order No.
890 transmission planning principles,66 and actually does produce
a regional transmission plan.67 In addition, PUTPs in neighboring
planning regions must implement procedures to “identify and
63. Proposed Rule, at 1–2. Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 Fed Reg. 112266, FERC
STATS. & REGS. ¶ 32,660 (2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 & 37)
[hereinafter “Order No. 890”].
64. U.S. Department of Energy, National Electric Transmission Congestion
Study (Dec. 2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Congestion
_Study_2009.pdf.
65. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 136 FERC
STATS. & REGS. ¶ 61051, at 31–32 (2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter “Order No. 1000”].
66. The Order 890 transmission planning principles are (i) coordination; (ii)
openness; (iii) transparency; (iv) information exchange; (v) comparability; (vi)
dispute resolution; (vii) regional participation; (viii) economic planning studies;
and (ix) cost allocation for new projects. See Grace S. Kurdian, et al., Energy
and Natural Resources Market Regulation, 2011 ABA ENV’T ENERGY, &
RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 181, 181 (2012).
67. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 57; STEVEN FERREY, 1 L. OF INDEP.
POWER § 8:10 (2012).
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jointly evaluate transmission facilities” that span both regions.68
Finally, regional transmission planning processes must, when
determining transmission needs, account for69 public policy
considerations—including any renewable portfolio standard
requirements.70 FERC views these as critical requirements,
because local transmission plans may not include the
considerations in regional level plans that would ultimately lead to
more cost-effective and efficient transmission planning.71 This is
important to renewable power generation and to wind power
specifically, because such resources often sit near state borders and
far from population centers.72 The regional transmission planning
process is typically the more appropriate forum for “reliably and
cost-effectively integrating location-constrained renewable energy
resources.”73
Order No. 1000 also includes transmission cost allocation
requirements. These requirements state that the regional
transmission planning process, in which the PUTPs participate,
must adopt a regional cost allocation method for new transmission
facilities. Any such method should take into account the “expected
beneficiaries” of the planned transmission project and
“appropriately” allocate the cost of new transmission among
consumers such that costs are borne by those receiving the benefits
from the project.74 FERC has made clear that the Order No. 1000
cost allocation requirements are intended to give PUTPs flexibility
in determining the composition of the cost allocation methods, but
requires that the method developed satisfy six specified cost
allocation principles.75 For transmission projects that span two or
68. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 57.
69. This includes both “identify[ing] transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements and evaluat[ing] potential solutions to meet those
identified needs.” Shelly Welton & Michael B. Gerrard, FERC Order 1000 as a
New Tool for Promoting Energy Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11025 (2012) (emphasis in original).
70. Kurdian, et al., supra note 66, at 182.
71. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 55, 64.
72. Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 503 (2011).
73. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 66.
74. Id. at 369; FERREY, supra note 67, at § 8:10.
75. The cost allocation principles include (i) proportional allocation of costs
commensurate with estimated benefits; (ii) prohibition of involuntary allocation
of costs to non-beneficiaries; (iii) use of reasonable benefit-to-cost ratio in
determination of whether a transmission facility should be selected in a regional
plan, such that no facility with significant net positive benefits is excluded; (iv)
confinement of cost allocation within the relevant planning region, unless the
outside region voluntarily agrees to assume a portion of the costs; (v) use of
transparent methods in determining benefits and identifying beneficiaries; and
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more regions, the same cost allocation requirements apply. In
addition, the regional cost allocation method adopted for
interregional projects must be common among the PUTPs in the
neighboring planning regions and satisfy the cost allocation
principles.76 These changes are of primary importance for wind
power integration because the growth of renewable generation
partly drives the urgent need for new interregional transmission
facilities. Sources of renewable generation, especially wind, are
“frequently remote from load centers” and thus necessitate
transmission facilities that traverse several regions.77
Certain commentators to the proposed Order No. 1000 felt that
the “deficiencies in transmission planning and cost allocation
processes [of Order No. 890]” resulted in a large number of
planned transmission projects not being built.78 One commentator
highlighted the “lack of transmission expansion” as the reason for
“significant congestion in areas with extensive operating wind
generation” and that “curtailments primarily caused by [such]
congestion” were getting worse over time.79 FERC views the
transmission planning and cost allocation requirements in Order
No. 1000 as crucial to support efficient and cost-effective
investment decisions that will fund the transmission upgrades
required to “meet reliability needs and integrate new sources of
generation.”80 As wind power holds tremendous potential as a
source of electricity generation, the ability of the U.S. transmission
system to integrate new sources of wind is crucial.
B. Eliminating the Right of First Refusal and Improving Conditions
for the Build Out of Transmission to Integrate Wind
Another important aspect of Order No. 1000 is the elimination
of the right of first refusal for an “incumbent transmission provider
with respect to transmission facilities” located within its territory.81
Prior to Order No. 1000, a PUTP had the option to build and own

(vi) the freedom of PUTPs to choose different cost allocation methods for
different facilities, such as those required for reliability, congestion relief, or to
achieve public policy goals. In addition, cost allocation methods must be
explained in the compliance filing of the PUTP. See Kurdian, et al., supra note
66, at 183.
76. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 416–17.
77. Id. at 469, 509.
78. Id. at 36–40.
79. Id. at 39.
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id. at 345.
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new transmission lines located within its jurisdiction.82 In practice,
this privilege stifled the ability of merchant developers and
independent transmission companies who covet the stable revenue
streams offered by transmission projects to bid on these
transmission projects.83 This is especially true in regions with large
renewable energy potential, particularly wind, where “developers
[have] been . . . literally falling over one another in a race to lock
down key markets and rights-of-way” for transmission projects.84
Although the elimination of the right of first refusal has the
potential to facilitate transmission system expansion and thus
indirectly promote the integration of wind generation, this mandate
lies at the cuff of FERC’s statutory authority. As such, it remains
to be seen whether the elimination of the right of first refusal
through Order No. 1000 will survive judicial scrutiny. On the one
hand, there is little precedent to support the extension of federal
jurisdiction to protect against discrimination in transmission
construction.85 In fact, recent jurisprudence has reaffirmed that
transmission construction traditionally falls within the bounds of
state regulatory authority.86 In an attempt to justify the expansion
of its jurisdiction under Order No. 1000, FERC clarified that its
elimination of the right of first refusal “excludes a new
transmission facility if the costs of that facility are borne entirely
by the [PUTP] in whose retail distribution service territory or
footprint that new transmission facility is to be located.”87
However, FERC goes on to clarify that any allocation of the costs
of a new facility outside its service territory or footprint requires a
regional cost allocation method application, and thus any such
transmission facility cannot be considered a local transmission
facility.88 In framing its jurisdiction argument, FERC is stating that
the elimination of the right of first refusal is not an attempt to
preempt state jurisdiction or force states to cede statutorily
assigned regulatory privileges,89 but is instead a legitimate attempt
to remedy “unduly discriminatory” and preferential treatment in
82. Radford, supra note 62, at 22.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. McGuire, supra note 24, at 577–78.
86. Id. at 579.
87. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000-B, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,044, 61,
159 (2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter “Order No. 1000B”].
88. Id.
89. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 314 (4th Cir.
2009).
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transmission facility construction, which is placed within FERC’s
regulatory purview90 once cost allocation is spread throughout the
region.91
CONCLUSION
The electricity transmission system in the United States lacks
capacity. This inadequate level of transmission infrastructure
hinders the integration of wind power generation into the grid and
thus inhibits wind power development. The DOE has identified
several areas of the country where improving transmission capacity
could directly increase the number of wind power installations. In
an attempt to facilitate the build out of the transmission system, the
federal government has put in place several programs to encourage
investment in infrastructure and improve the regional planning
process to better integrate wind generation facilities into the grid.
Both FERC Order No. 679 and FERC Order No. 1000 can have a
continued positive impact on transmission expansion. As long as
there exists a need for more capacity, FERC will undoubtedly push
to extend its jurisdictional reach in an attempt to facilitate
transmission expansion.

90. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
91. Order No. 1000-B, supra note 87, at 61, 158.

